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Abstract 
 
In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and Dervis 
Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration that established certain 
“ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- 
could be revived. The main stimulant prompting this evolution was the discovery of new 
energy sources in the Eastern Mediterranean, and especially offshore the RoC. In October 
2014, Turkish navigational warning notified mariners that Turkey would soon perform its 
seismic surveys in sea areas that encroach on Cyprus’s EEZ, raising concerns on the 
escalation of the intractable and protracted Cyprus conflict. Aim of this research project is 
to provide readers with an insight on how the flow between energy and power politics is 
played out in the Eastern Mediterranean. Suggesting that the existing tensions extend 
beyond the struggle over the existing material energy assets in the seabed of the Levant 
Basin, the project casts light upon the notion of energy security by setting forth the 
indicators it is composed of. While scrutinizing the statements of the leaders on these 
events and seeking to highlight the security discourses they are coming up with, the project 
resorts to discourse analysis.  
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Introduction 
 
In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and 
Dervis Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration establishing certain 
“ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- 
could be revived. This evolution was arguably prompted by the discovery of new energy 
sources in the Eastern Mediterranean, and especially offshore the RoC. Gas had initially 
been portrayed as a potential catalyst for a restart of the long-standing peace process, and 
possibly for its successful conclusion. Nevertheless, a couple of months later, it seemed 
that these discoveries had worked against these aspirations and added chill to the Cyprus 
conflict. In October 2014, a Turkish navigational warning notified mariners that Turkey 
would soon perform its seismic surveys in sea areas that encroach on Cyprus’s EEZ, 
raising concerns on the escalation of the existing protracted conflict. Anastasiades 
withdrew from the negotiations, attributing his decision to these activities. 
 
If someone had to summarize the Cyprus conflict in a few words, he would quote the 
aphorism of the deceased former President of the RoC, Glafkos Clerides’: “What satisfies 
their fears is what increases our fears, and so we have this paradoxical situation that unless 
we can find a way in which the fears of both communities are put at rest, it would be 
extremely difficult to find a solution to the Cyprus problem” (Coughlan 1991: 92). This 
phrase seems to capture the very essence of the diachronic security dilemma on the island. 
Reading into thorough analyses, embedded in the rich literature of the Cyprus studies, we 
have figured out that the roots of the Cyprus conflict, and other intractable conflicts alike, 
are mapped more into intangible sociological, cultural, religious and psychological factors 
rather than scarce resources. These intangible factors have resulted in a sense of mutual 
suspicion that exerts a significant influence in the tensions unfolding in the present. 
 
The challenge of the current thesis is to comprehend how the legacies, based in the past, 
come into play in the course of the current developments. The central research objective of 
this project is to provide readers with an explanatory account on how the interplay between 
energy and power politics operates. We seek to sketch out a comprehensive framework for 
energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean, while bringing the intractable Cyprus conflict 
to the forefront. 
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In periods of such distress, grassroots expect their political leaders to step up and 
communicate a narrative explaining what is at stake, who is the threat and why. In other 
words, the leaders are expected to establish the proper “security discourses”. The research 
question that this article intends to address is: what are the indicators that formulate these 
“security discourses”? This question gains currency if we consider that the crisis episodes 
extend beyond the material resources in the seabed of the Levant Basin. They occur among 
entities whose relations have been characterized by historically mutual antagonism. In the 
light of the intractable nature of the Cyprus conflict, we want to learn which factors led the 
assigned political leaders of the contending parties to “securitize” the recent gas discoveries 
in the region the way they did. To this end, the current study places the concept of energy 
security under critical scrutiny by dissecting how the political leaders manipulate it.  
 
To sufficiently tackle this question, certain steps seem necessary. The first part focuses on 
the very notion of security. Following the constructivist thought, we claim that its 
formation unfolds in various contexts and refers to various referent objects. The procedure 
that underscores the formation of its subjective character is “securitization”, meaning the 
discursive construction of threat (Buzan et al 1998). Using the recent tensions as our case 
study, the second part explains how securitization discourses unfold within that time frame. 
To this effect, it sheds light to the related statements and speeches, delivered by the 
political leaders of the disputants. Blame-games, pointing fingers and assigning the label of 
security threat to one another are expected to litter the speeches and interviews during 
these times.  
The next step is to proceed with the definition of energy security. For the sake of this 
article we define it as the embodiment of two indicators that relate to its content and 
context dependent character respectively: availability and accessibility. Concerning the first, 
particular attention is paid to the estimations on the amount of the recent natural gas 
reserves that have been discovered around the island. The accessibility pillar, largely 
pertaining to the very notion of energy security, contains the geopolitical relations among 
the actors involved or potentially involved in exploiting these discoveries. Geopolitical 
relations as a notion, though, are too broad and vague. Therefore, we squeeze them into 
two contexts: legal and historical. As to the first, we try to identify how the disputants 
adopted international law to give legitimacy to their course of action, with particular 
reference to certain provisions of UNCLOS. As to the second, the paper embarks upon 
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the historical journey that explains the diachronically incompatible objectives of the 
disputants.  
 
 
Theoretical Framework: understanding energy security in the 
constructivist thought 
 
The notion of security in the realist thought 
Edward Azar (1986: 28), a pioneer in the field of conflict studies, describes “denial of 
security needs” as an important variable in the genesis and the crystallization of protracted 
conflicts. The heartbreaking plight, in which the divided island of Cyprus finds itself today, 
is the manifestation of a dilemma which human societies have had to grapple with since the 
dawn of history: the security dilemma, coined by Herz (1950: 157). Security dilemma 
describes a constellation wherein an actor, seeking to increase his security, triggers the 
unintended effect of decreasing the security of the other. Groups, being “trapped” in such 
a predicament, are worried about their security “from being attacked, subjected, dominated 
or annihilated by other groups or individuals.” (ibid) Seeking to attain security from such 
an attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power aiming to alleviate the impact of 
the others’ power. This in turn, renders them more insecure and urges them to get 
prepared for armed conflicts or even for wars.  
 
The quest for security -whether economic or military- raises a sense of urgency to politics 
and, thus, it constitutes one of the enduring sources of passion in policy controversies 
(Stone 2002: 88). Nonetheless, security is not devoid of meaning. It may be perceived for 
instance, as the preservation of a group’s or a nation’s core values. Such a broad and vague 
definition of security, though, does not sufficiently throw light on the identity of the 
groups, on the content of their core values and on where threats to these values come from 
(McDonald 2008: 61). The idea that security can be reduced to objective and countable 
needs is politically problematic. As Wolfers (1952: 491-92;) first postulated: states vary 
widely in the value they place on security while some of them may be so dissatisfied with 
the status quo that they are more interested in acquiring new values than in securing the 
values they already have. On account of these theoretical loopholes, we infer that although 
the realist thought has provided us with an intellectual insight into the overpowering effect 
of security in the bilateral relations, this concept is not as straightforward as it appears in 
their analyses. Therefore, we might lose a great deal when we squeeze the actor’s behavior 
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into the universalist and abstract categories that the realist thought provides (Jervis 1988: 
344).  
 
The contribution of constructivism and the concept of securitization 
This is where the school of constructivism steps in. For constructivists, answers to these 
questions are different depending on the context and evolve through social interaction 
between the disputants. Specifically, constructivists treat security as a context-specific social 
construction. Instead of developing abstract definitions of security, constructivists and 
especially the Copenhagen School (CS), have focused on how security itself is given 
meaning through the inter-subjective processes that unfold between the disputants in 
geographically and historically specified contexts. 
 
What animates the CS is the concept of ‘securitization’ that refers to the discursive 
construction of threat (Buzan et al 1998). More concretely, securitization may be identified 
as a process in which an actor assigns the label of an existential threat to a particular issue, 
dynamic or actor. The invocation of security opens the window for the political leader to 
mobilize special powers in order to handle existential threats (ibid: 21).Therefore, the 
meaning of security is not located in a philosophical and abstract universe, but lies in its 
very usage by the authorized political leaders.  
 
The way to study securitization is to study discourse constellations. In security discourse, a 
topic is dramatized and presented by the political leaders as a topic of supreme priority. 
Hence, by framing an issue as security, a political leader claims a need for and a right to 
treat it even by extraordinary means.  
 
Despite its subjective character, in order to adroitly direct the audience’s attention towards 
an event- construed as dangerous, the words of the leader need to resonate with the 
framework within which his reactions are collocated. This means, that the security 
statements of a political leader, aiming to win an audience must be associated with an 
existing external reality, for instance an evidently aggressive course of action performed by 
the opponent (Balzaq 2005: 182). This action must be perceived by the public as an action 
that violates the sovereignty and/or the resources of the state entity.  
 
 
 
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal   Vol. 27 
 
10 
 
General observations on energy security  
A field that could easily become subject to “securitization” is energy. The drive to control 
oil and natural resources is frequently said to be a cause of wars between states and within 
states. Energy trends and international politics are innately interconnected and energy 
security is an integral part of the foreign and national security policies of states. A country’s 
ability to access energy supplies and the ways in which it uses energy determine the state of 
its national security (Shaffer 2009). Rooted in the industrialization of the society, the very 
notion of energy security has traditionally been identified as the “safety and source 
diversification of energy fuels and services” (Sovacool& Brown 2009: 7). 
 
Nevertheless, the meaning of energy fuels and services has been contingent upon content 
perspective. For most of the 20th century, public security concerns were almost exclusively 
concentrated on oil and coal supply.  World War I and World War II had starkly 
highlighted the prominence of oil and coal in high politics (Yergin 2009: 773). Some 
decades later, these concerns had reached their peak during the 1970s when Western 
society, almost in its entirety, struggled to overcome the economically disastrous 
implications of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 oil crises1. The shortages and spiking prices that 
resulted from the embargoes functioned as a critical juncture for many European countries 
to change their then dominant path of energy dependence by diversifying their resources 
away from Middle East oil. 
 
Natural gas at the forefront 
These oil crises expanded the nation-state laden and traditional concept of energy security 
to cover energy sources other than oil. The reason is that new natural gas discoveries and 
rising demand have shifted gas from a cluster of regional markets into a global marketplace 
(Gloystein 21.11.2012). Natural gas is currently the third most important energy source, 
after oil and coal, and is rapidly gaining prominence in global energy markets. Attributed to 
its relatively clean and efficient combustion, natural gas is emerging as the fuel of choice 
for a wide array of uses, like the generation of electric power (Barnes J. et al 2006: 1).  
 
                                                 
1 With the nationalization of much of the Middle East’s oil industries, the oil embargoes triggered inflation in 
many OECD countries and ultimately resulted into economic recessions, substantial losses of GDP and high 
unemployment (Yergin 1988). 
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As a traded good, natural gas is supplied with permanent infrastructure and long-term 
supply arrangements, like pipelines and LNG2 infrastructures. These infrastructures are 
extremely costly to build and require long-run horizons as well as a predictable geopolitical 
and economic context for investors to “sink their capital and knowledge” (Barnes et al 
2006: 3). The required long-term supply relationships and the permanent infrastructure 
offer a window of much greater opportunity for (geo)politics to come into play (Shaffer 
2013: 114-115). Due to the state-regulated sphere, within which the gas market is operating 
(ibid.), governments are urged to play a larger role in the natural gas trade. Infrastructure 
projects link states and mirror the geopolitical relations among them. Thus, states in 
choosing routes to export their commodities and import their energy supplies naturally 
consider and promote their political ramifications of various route options (ibid.). 
Decisions on natural gas export projects are especially likely to be affected by political 
considerations because they can be quite risky otherwise (Shaffer 2009: 2).  
 
Operationalizing “securitization” of natural gas in the Cyprus conflict 
We observed above that the concept of energy security is not as straightforward as it might 
appear in various analyses. How it is conveyed is context dependent and springs from 
patterns of the anarchic international politics (Ciuta 2010: 130). What begs the question is 
how we narrow down the concept of energy security and comprehend it in the imbroglio 
of the Cypriot realities? Making use of the definitions of APERC (2007) and Kruyt et al 
(2009: 2168), this article treats the concept of energy security as the embodiment of two 
main indicators, two A’s: 
 
a. the availability of gas reserves in the region, which, in general, pertains to the classical 
notion of geological or physical availability of hydrocarbon resources in the region3. The 
indicator here is the exploration context. By exploration context, we mean here the amount 
of gas reserves, reported, estimated and/or discovered offshore the RoC.  
 
b. the accessibility that signifies the political and economic “barriers” to ensure that energy 
supplies remain accessible (APERC 2007: 19). Energy security largely pertains to this 
indicator, since a depletion of energy reserves has seen countries struggle to maintain 
                                                 
2 Liquefied Natural Gas 
3 It should be stressed that large uncertainties surround the amounts of hydrocarbon resources and their 
extraction potential. Few studies provide estimates of fossil fuel resources and the most significant one is that 
of the US Geological Survey. 
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steady and accessible energy services. Factors that influence accessibility include the 
relations between the surrounding countries, especially when they are disputing over the 
“availability” of the resources. In order to understand how this indicator works in the 
current study, light will be cast upon the: 
 
i. Legal context: we sketch out here the application of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the Eastern Mediterranean, with special reference to the 
delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. 
Setting out the legal framework is instrumental in comprehending the legal positions and 
constraints within which the “securitization discourses” of the disputants evolve. 
 
ii. Historical context: the paper will lay out the historical background that has shaped the 
relations between the contending parties. The challenge here is to identify and document if 
and how the lexicon of the protracted Cyprus conflict encourages modulations and 
transpositions in the meanings that the authorized political leaders assign to energy 
security. 
 
 
Methodology and Data: securitization of natural gas discoveries 
through the statements of the political leaders 
 
Data 
To identify the securitization of the gas discoveries around the island, the current paper 
resorts, first of all, to the statements that the leaders in Cyprus delivered during the period 
of the tensions.  It was in October 2014 when the President of RoC decided to pull out of 
the re-unification negotiations, after the Turkish seismic vessel Barbaros illegally entered 
RoC’s EEZ. Security issues, particularly energy security issues came to the spotlight. It is 
interesting to observe how the political leaders articulated their security concerns vis-à-vis 
each other through the statements delivered at that time (Table 1).  
Why do we pay attention to these figures? Irrespective of whether these leaders activate 
their constituencies, they engage in opinion-making behavior. As Rosenau (1963: 6) 
underlines, national opinion-makers are considered to be those members of every society 
who occupy positions which enable them to transmit, with some regularity, opinions about 
national security issues to their constituencies and to point to what is at stake. 
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Why do we explicitly concentrate on the above-mentioned periods? People experience 
tensions, like the ones in October 2014, as episodes of threat and uncertainty. They face 
them as a grave predicament requiring urgent action (Rosenthal et al 2001). It is a natural 
inclination in such distress to look to their political leaders to step up and communicate a 
message or a narrative that explains what is at stake, who is the threat and why. The 
perceptive quality of these tensions is what we want to bring into scrutiny during these 
kinds of periods by documenting the phraseology that the leaders adopt. Within this time-
frame of tensions we seek to identify and highlight “existential language as an indicator of 
securitization through the suggestion of a sense of urgency and prioritization” 
(Fischhendler& Nathan 2014: 155).  
Table 1: Statements of political leaders in October 2014 
Date President of the RoC 
Anastasiades 
Turkish Cypriot Leader- Dervis Eroglu 
3/10/2014  Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak 
Television Channel) 
7/10/2014 Response Letter to Eroglu 
(Press and Information Office- 
PIO) 
Interview with Turkish Cypriot Newspaper 
Diyalog) 
8/10/2014 Letter to the UN Secretary 
General 
Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak 
Television Channel) 
10/10/2014 Statement on the occasion of 
the celebration of the 54th 
anniversary of Cyprus 
Independence  
 
13/10/2014  Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Star Kibris 
Newspaper) 
14/10/2014 Official statement (Press and 
Information Office) 
Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Gunes 
Newspaper) 
15/10/2014 Statement on the occasion of 
“Stelios Bi-communal Business 
Awards” 2014 
Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot 
Newspaper Kibris) 
17/10/2014  Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot Bayrak 
Television Channel) 
19/10/2014 Statement at the unveiling in 
Pachna village of the bust of 
Kyriacos Stylianou 
Letter to the UN Secretary General 
22/10/2014 Response to the statement of 
Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Ahmet Davutoglu 
Statement during a meeting with union of veteran 
fighters (according to Turkish Cypriot newspaper 
Vatan)  
24/10/2014  Statement (according to Turkish Cypriot daily 
newspaper Kibris) 
27/10/2014 Statement on the occasion of 
an official lunch in honor of 
Archbishop of America 
Demetrios 
Statement on the occasion of a meeting in Istanbul 
30/10/2014  Statement on the occasion of the 91st anniversary 
of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey 
Source: Author 
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Discourse analysis 
By examining the “securitization” procedure or otherwise the “discursive construction of 
threat”, this project will resort to discourse analysis in order to generate the categories of 
meaning (George 1994: 29) by which energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean can be 
understood and explained. Discourses refer to communication practices that systematically 
construct our knowledge of reality. A discourse “embodies a shared set of capabilities 
which enable the assemblage of words, phrases and sentences into meaningful texts 
intelligible to the readers” (Dryzek 1988: 710). By critically reflecting upon these 
statements, we seek to map out what “truths” on energy security issues these documents 
establish. 
 
We document expressions centered on blame games, threats and referent object (the gas 
discoveries). The specific words and phrases will explain how and why the one side 
portrays the other as a danger to its security. We aspire to understand how securitization 
unfolds within these speeches, and what historical as well as legal dynamics underlie the 
leaders’ energy security discourses. More particularly we highlight two variables within 
specific sentences of the statements. The first, the dependent one, is composed of key 
words and phrases that unveil the articulations of the leaders’ energy security concerns 
(who is the threat, what is at stake). The second, the independent one, is prognosticative of 
the legalistic argumentation and consists of references to the experiences of the past. The 
independent variable, which refers to the legal and historical context of the accessibility 
pillar, will be analyzed in the following sections. 
 
The securitization discourses by the President of the Republic of 
Cyprus: Turkish drilling activities as a reason for the negotiations to 
collapse 
The most significant document at our disposal, signifying the securitization procedure on 
behalf of the Greek-Cypriot side, is the protest letter that President Anastasiades sent UN 
Secretary-General Bank Ki-moon in October 6, 2014 (Christou 21.10.2014). In this letter, 
he demonstrated his decision to pull out of the then-running negotiations. Turkish 
activities (of the seismic vessels) were recalled as the reason for his withdrawal and 
portrayed as the main threat torpedoing any possibility for the re-unification of the island. 
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His very words were that Turkish actions “strike a heavy blow against the negotiations for 
the settlement of the Cyprus problem”.  He claimed that the Turkish encroachment on the 
island’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) has been articulated as a determinant factor, which 
had brought the negotiations into collapse. Pointing a finger to the Turkish side, he stated 
that their activities “destroy the efforts of creating a good and positive environment and 
actually derail the whole negotiating process”. “The increasingly aggressive nature of 
Turkey’s actions in areas in the eastern Mediterranean under the jurisdiction of the 
Republic of Cyprus” was one of the key phrases in his statement. He added that 
“negotiating under constant threat and blackmail that undermine all efforts to create the 
good environment necessary for a successful outcome of the negotiations for the 
settlement of the Cyprus problem is not just counterproductive. “It also has a negative 
effect on public opinion,” he noted in the letter. 
In order to further highlight the portrayal of Turkish actions as a threat, he used the 
adjective “provocative” characterizing “Turkey’s decision to reserve areas, including parts 
of Cyprus EEZ for seismic surveys”. He adopted the same adjective to claim that these 
Turkish activities “had been the culmination of a continued provocative policy of disputing 
and interfering with the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus in its exclusive 
economic zone”. In this context he described that “this provocative policy included, apart 
from continued verbal threats and rhetoric, the harassment of vessels performing lawful 
activities authorized by the government of the Republic of Cyprus, by Turkish warships 
and military aircraft, and unlawful seismic surveys within the western exclusive economic 
zone of Cyprus by Turkish vessels”. 
 
While the security discourses have been set forth above (the dependent variable), special 
attention will be paid to the last words of the last sentence. In this sentence, we realize how 
the legal pillar of energy security, one aspect of the independent variable comes into play 
amid the securitization procedure. Additionally, he stressed that Cyprus’ EEZ was 
delineated in 2004 in accordance with international law. 
 
On Tuesday 7.10.2014, Anastasiades delivered a statement confirming his decision to 
suspend his participation in the UN-led re-unification talks. He justified his withdrawal, 
among other reasons, in the positions expressed by the Turkish Cypriot Leader, Dervis 
Eroglu (that will be underlined later). In this statement, the blame is not solely laid on 
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Turkey, as before, but also on the Turkish-Cypriots. While pointing a finger, he questioned 
whether the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot actions served any pre-electoral objectives4 or 
any other expediency. He added that the Turkish activities, which blatantly violated the 
sovereign rights of the RoC (legal pillar as the independent variable), underrated any 
potential benefits that the country would gain from a solution of the Cyprus question and 
torpedoed the efforts to find a just, viable and functional solution for the benefit of all the 
Cypriot people. 
Two days later,5 Anastasiades expressed his hope that the Turkish Cypriot community and 
Turkey would redress “the recent provocations and undertake the necessary practical and 
substantial steps towards this end”. Furthermore, he acknowledged “that although the 
Cyprus problem has been decisively shaped by a number of external factors, we, the 
Cypriots, have also committed mistakes”, adding that “we must have the courage to admit 
that we have failed to adequately address the challenges posed by the growing tensions that 
infiltrated the two communities and resulted in a deterioration of inter-communal 
bonding”. 
The last statement of Anastasiades deviates content-wise (not significantly though) from 
the previous ones. He used the term “Cypriot” to connote common characteristics that the 
Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots share while potentially portraying Turkey as an 
“external factor”6. In any case, the reference to the history that connects and divides the 
grassroots constituencies on the island reflects a statement, wherein history, as an 
independent variable, comes into play in the securitization procedure. 
 
The securitization discourses by the Turkish Cypriot leader: “Greek 
Cypriots are responsible for the current impasse” 
Turkish Cypriot leader, Dervis Eroglu, in his turn, was pointing fingers at the Greek 
Cypriot counterpart for the stalemate of the re-unification talks. He stated that 
“Anastasiades has left the talks in order to escape from a unified solution” (KP Daily News 
7.10.2014).  He portrayed the Greek Cypriots as being the problem since they are the ones 
“embracing diversion tactics to withdraw from the talks.” Besides this, he strongly 
advocated the presence of the Turkish vessel in the region: “it is not right to expect the 
                                                 
4 It was not clear during that moment whether Eroglu would run for the upcoming elections in the Turkish 
Cypriot part of the island. 
5 On the occasion of an event at the English School during the celebration of the 54th anniversary of Cyprus’ 
independence  http://www.parikiaki.com/2014/10/cyprus-hopes-that-turkey-will-redress-its-
provocations/#sthash.XS45WRJm.dpuf  
6 This term can be attributed to other countries, given the geopolitical complexity of the Cyprus question. 
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Turkish Cypriots to abandon their rights and for Turkey to stop activities that work on the 
benefit and the protection of the Turkish Cypriots, while the attitude of south Cyprus is 
not cooperative” (ibid.)  
In another interview he (again) held the Greek-Cypriots accountable for the current 
tensions by stating that “President Nicos Anastasiades finds himself in the delusion that 
southern Cypriots are the only sovereign owners of Cyprus”. He portrayed the Greek 
Cypriots as being the threat to Turkish Cypriots justifying his opinion in the performance 
of search-rescue activities carried out by Israel and Russia in the East Mediterranean (in 
cooperation with the Greek-Cypriots), and the tension and diplomatic initiatives taken by 
the Greek Cypriots, who, according to his view, would like to use their diplomatic leverage 
to impose their will on the Turkish Cypriots.” 
 
He said “in the negotiations with south Cyprus we have come to an agreement, according 
to which the natural resources and petrol in the seas will belong mutually to the Turkish 
Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, that the usage of these will be left to the authority of a 
federal state and that the agreements regarding the management will pass through the 
parliament with a qualified majority vote, which means that the Turkish side will have a 
right” (KP Daily News 14.10.2014). He characterized “the south Cyprus’ one sided 
sovereignty claims as a signal of their insincerity. Stressing the legal pillar of the energy 
security discourses, he claimed that, in alignment with the principles of the Sea Laws, “in 
half closed seas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the boundaries of the sea areas can 
only be determined when the bordering states agree upon the delimitation of the sea 
management areas”. He evoked again the legal pillar by saying that, “south Cyprus does not 
have such an agreement with Turkey or with the Turkish Cypriots”. Due to this lack of 
agreement the Greek Cypriot cannot raise any claims with respect to the “illegality” of the 
Turkish-Turkish Cypriot agreements. He also underlined that these agreements have 
emerged as an outcome of Greek Cypriots’ reluctance to come to terms either with them 
or Turkey. On these grounds he justified his decision to pass the management of the 
natural resources on to Turkey Petrol Anon Partnership (ibid).  
 
Explaining the pillars of “energy security” in the Cyprus QuestionThe 
previous part set forth the energy “securitization discourses” of the disputants. It depicted 
how the leaders have articulated the recent gas discoveries as a security issue, how they 
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portrayed the threats and stressed what is at stake. This part concentrates on these 
indicators that have potentially contributed to these modulations of energy security. As 
stressed above, these indicators are to be found in the notion of energy security as the 
embodiment of the two pillars: availability and accessibility. Due to the content and context 
dependent character of energy security, we need to know how these indicators are 
operationalized in the context of the Cypriot realities. 
 
 
The availability pillar of energy security: the exploratory context 
This section sheds light on the availability indicator that is embodied in the notion of 
energy security. More particularly, this part focuses on the documented and estimated 
amount of gas reserves in the region that surrounds the island of Cyprus, the Eastern 
Mediterranean. Until the past decade, much of the hydrocarbons in the Eastern 
Mediterranean went undiscovered because the resources lie in very deep waters (known in 
the industry as “ultra-deep-water”), with depths exceeding 2 km(1,24 miles) in some 
locations (Gurel et al. 2013: 1). This made it technically difficult, risky and expensive to 
carry out drilling activities in the area. Nevertheless, technological advances, accompanied 
by high international oil prices, which tended to encourage oil and gas companies to invest 
in these activities, prompted new exploration initiatives at the dawn of the 21st century. 
Employing a geology assessment methodology, the U.S Geological Survey in March 2010 
estimated a mean of 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in the Levant Basin 
Province7. The Levant Basin is located along and off the coast of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, 
and the Gaza Strip, extending westward into Cypriot waters (see Picture 1). The basin 
comprises a total sea and land area of 32.000 square miles, most of which is offshore and 
bounded by three distinct subsea features: 
a) the Tartus Fault to the north 
b) the Erosthenes Mount to the West 
c) the Nile Delta to the south 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that in the oil and gas industry, the USGS reports are considered merely indicative and 
are not taken as a reliable indicator of expected volumes. The outcomes of further exploration efforts are a 
prerequisite to estimate with greater accuracy the extent of oil and gas volumes in the region. See Shaffer B. 
(June 2012) “Energy Resources and Markets in the Eastern Mediterranean Region” GMF Policy Brief 
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Picture 1: The Levant Basin 
 
 
Source: US Geological Survey (March 2010): 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf 
 
 
By global standards, the Levant Basin’s gas resources are significant but not predominant. 
Russia for example, holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves at 1,680 tcf, accounting 
for about 25% of global gas reserves. By Mediterranean standards, the Levant Basin’s 
offshore natural gas reserves are sizeable, but they are less than the gas resources held by 
key North African producers, like Algeria (Paraschos 2013). 
 
In the early 2000s, the government of the Republic of Cyprus had hired the Norwegian 
company PGS to perform a preliminary assessment of Cyprus’s hydrocarbons potential 
through seismic surveys. These kinds of surveys would contribute to determine whether it 
would be worth performing much more costly exploratory drilling (Giamourides 2013). 
PGS’s research outcomes proved favorable to this direction. In 2006 the Republic of 
Cyprus began prospecting for hydrocarbons in an exploration area of 51,000 sq km 
offshore the island (Gurel et al 2013: 3). Having proclaimed their EEZ, RoC (a topic that 
we will touch upon below) divided its exploration area into 13 blocks, as illustrated in Map 
1. 
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Map 1: The RoC’s present offshore exploration area along with its proximity in the 
south-east to the gas fields discovered by Israel 
 
 
Source: Petroleum Gas Geo-Services (PGS), cited in Gurel et al 2013, p. 4 
 
In February 2007 and relying on the available seismic data, the RoC initiated its first 
international tender for three-year gas exploration licenses offering 11 out of 13 blocks (3 
and 13 were excluded). Nevertheless, only three small to medium-sized companies made 
bids. Larger international companies, due to their access to more attractive opportunities 
around the world, did not manifest any interest in the Cypriot hydrocarbons. As an 
outcome, the government of Cyprus awarded only one license in October 2008 to Noble 
Energy that had already been operating offshore Israel. After multiple seismic surveys, the 
first exploratory drilling unfolded in Block 12 in September 2011. Two months later, the 
company indicated a 5-8 tcf natural gas deposit in deep waters of about 1,700 meters 
(Ashurst 2012). This range of estimates seems too broad to confirm the commercial 
viability of the field. However, this discovery, in alignment with large findings in the Israeli 
Leviathan block, triggered a significant interest for the second Cyprus offshore licensing 
round that started in February 2012 with the participation of 15 bidders, including 
International Oil Companies8, upstream independents, natural gas buyers, as well as gas 
and LNG traders. Licenses were awarded for five offshore blocks out of twelve on offer. 
The Italian ENI and Korean Kogas are drilling in Blocks 2, 3 and 9 of Cyprus’ EEZ since 
the third quarter of 2014, followed by Total expected to drill in Blocks 10 and 11 of 
Cyprus’ EEZ in 2015. 
 
                                                 
8 The  most significant ones were: Total of France, ENI of Italy, Gazprombank of Russia, Petronas of 
Malaysia and Kogas of South Korea, cited in Gurel et al (2013); 4 
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The legal context as an accessibility pillar of energy security 
The aim of this section is to explain how the legal framework of availability indicator 
comes into play within the securitization procedure of the natural gas reserves. We outline 
the “official rules of the game” by which the state-protagonists in the current tensions are 
supposed to abide, in order to grasp an understanding of the legal context within which the 
“security discourses” are unfolding.  
There is a well-developed body of international law governing maritime boundaries and 
rights to undersea resources. The basic rules are set out in the 1982 UNCLOS with 
arbitration and judicial facilities available to resolve disputes, notably through the ICJ and 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). As of January 2015, 166 
countries and the European Union have joined the Convention. The four states that voted 
against its adoption back in 1982, and are not still parties to it, are Israel, Turkey, USA and 
Venezuela. It should be underlined, though, that certain provisions of UNCLOS III have 
acquired customary international law status.  
 
UNCLOS III divides the marine space that is within the limits of national jurisdiction into 
several zones. 
a. the territorial sea (up to 12nm from the baselines9) 
b. the contiguous zone (up to an additional 12nm) 
c. the EEZ (up to 200nm) 
d. the continental shelf (up to 200nm or 350 nm under certain conditions). 
 
Part five of that convention, more precisely Articles 55 to 75, entitles coastal states to an 
EEZ of up to 200 nautical miles. In accordance with Article 56, these rights confer to the 
purpose of “exploring, conserving, and managing living and nonliving resources of both 
the waters and the seabed and subsoil”. The rules in question apply to all oceans and seas, 
including enclosed or semi-enclosed, such as the Mediterranean or parts of it. In this kind 
of sea, issues of maritime boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts are 
likely to unfold for various reasons, ranging from the geographical peculiarities of the 
coastlines in question to the poor political relationship between the states concerned 
(Scovazzi 2012: 4-5). 
                                                 
9 UNCLOS III Art. 5 “Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale 
charts officially recognized by the coastal State”. 
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In 1988 the RoC ratified UNCLOS. The RoC delimited its EEZ in the south-western, 
southern and south-eastern direction through separate bilateral agreements, respectively 
with Egypt, Lebanon (that are contributing parts of the UNCLOS) and Israel (that has not 
become a contributing part of the UNCLOS). All three agreements contain more or less 
identical provisions, and according to all of them, boundaries are delineated in the spirit of 
the median line principle (Gurel et al 2013: 26). 
 
On February 2003, RoC and Egypt signed in Cairo an Agreement on the Delimitation of 
the EEZ. The coastlines of the parties are opposed and located quite far away one from 
each other (Scovazzi 2012:6). The parties clearly stated in the agreement that the 
delimitation “is effected by the median line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest point of the base line of the two parties” (Article 1, para a). In 2007, RoC made a 
similar agreement with Lebanon (Karyotis 2011; Scovazzi 2012: 7). The agreement, not 
ratified yet by the Lebanese parliament, and relating to the eastern part of the 
Mediterranean Sea, delimits most of the EEZ between the opposite coasts of Cyprus and 
Lebanon. Finally, in December 2010, RoC and Israel signed a bilateral agreement 
delimiting the EEZ between them. The distance from Israel to RoC is 230 nm and both 
parties had to adopt the median line method, meaning that each side would use 115 nm of 
EEZ (Scovazzi 2012: 7). 
 
 
Map 2: RoC’s EEZ boundaries as agreed with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel 
 
Source: Cited in Burel et al 2013, p. 27 
 
 
From the very beginning, Turkey had manifested its opposition to these agreements. First 
of all, Turkey, together with Turkish Cypriots, does not recognize the existence of the 
Republic of Cyprus and the international community’s perception of the present political 
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status quo in Cyprus (the historical section will explain why). They believe that Greek 
Cypriots cannot legitimately represent the RoC as a whole, as this contradicts the 1960 
Treaties. Based on this, they fiercely object to all relative actions performed by the RoC 
relating to EEZ and offshore hydrocarbons development (Gurel& Le Cornu 2014: 18). 
They argue that any unilateral Greek Cypriot action in this field, before a settlement, does 
not only ignore the legitimate rights of Turkish Cypriots, but also establishes a fait accompli 
that prejudices the terms of a prospective settlement on sovereignty issues to the 
disadvantage of the Turkish Cypriots (ibid.). Addressing these objections, the Greek 
Cypriots, being in charge of the internationally recognized RoC government, claim that, as 
a contributing part of the UNCLOS, have the “inalienable and non-negotiable” right to 
explore for and exploit the natural resources in their EEZ. They underline that this right is 
non-conditional upon a settlement and should not be considered as a bi-communal issue to 
be put on the negotiation table for the unification talks. It should be stressed though, that 
Greek Cypriots, in alignment with the opinion held by the international community, accept 
that the management of the island’s natural resources should be for the benefit of all the 
original residents of the island. 
 
To understand the second reason why Turkey and Turkish Cypriots hold this negative 
standing vis-à-vis the above mentioned agreements, one must go back to the year 1982. 
Although Turkey participated in the UNCLOS negotiations, Turkey has not signed either 
ratified UNCLOS, primarily because of its dispute with Greece over maritime boundaries it 
has unilaterally raised in the Aegean Sea. Turkey is not a party to UNCLOS. The Turkish 
perspective is that certain provisions of UNCLOS10, with special reference to Articles 3, 33, 
and 121 of the Treaty, puts vital interests of Turkey in the Aegean into jeopardy. 
 
Utilizing the customary character of the international sea law, Turkey applies a territorial 
sea law that in general, delineates the breadth of its territorial sea at 6 NM (Gurel et al 
2013: 31). Nevertheless, this delimitation is conditioned on a proviso authorization by the 
Council of Ministers (CoM) ‘to establish the breadth of the territorial sea, in certain seas, 
up to a limit exceeding six nautical miles, under reservation to take into account all special 
                                                 
10 Which do not fall under the scope of the current project despite their relative importance 
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circumstances and relevant situations therein, and in conformity with the equity principle’11 
(ibid.). For the time being, Turkey applies a 6 NM limit to the territorial sea in the Aegean 
Sea while the limit in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea is 12 NM, as provisioned in 
a CoM decree (ibid)12. Turkey has no continental shelf- or EEZ-related legislation. A CoM 
decree established the Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea at 200 NM (ibid.) but no EEZ 
proclamation exists. 
 
As a reaction to the commencement of exploratory drilling authorized by the RoC 
government off the island’s southern coast, and aiming at restoring the “balance of 
powers” in the region, on 21 September 2011 the Turkish Cypriots signed a continental 
shelf delimitation agreement with Turkey. The contributing parts drew a boundary line 
between the northern coast of Cyprus and the southern coast of Turkey in the 
Mediterranean seas. In doing so, Turkish Cypriots issued licenses to TPAO13 to conduct 
three-dimensional seismic research along with onshore and offshore drilling around 
maritime borders between the northern part of the island and Turkey.  
 
The historical context as an accessibility pillar of energy security 
This sub-part addresses the second parameter of the accessibility pillar, the historical 
context. Rather than treating history as a dead subject, irrelevant of the current energy 
tensions, we should conceive it as a living process, as a continuous path dependence, that 
links developments throughout decades and encourages us to concentrate on such linkages 
and their influence in the securitization procedure of the current events.  
 
Geography  
Throughout recorded time, the political experience in the island has reflected the 
interlocking impact of two utterly basic geographic factors: size and location (James 
2002:3). The total area of the island is 9.251 square kilometers, 10 square kilometers of 
                                                 
11 Act No. 2674 of 20 May 1982, on the Territorial Sea of the Republic of Turkey, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TUR.htm (Retrieved at 
27.2.2015), 
12 Decree No. 8/4742, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/TUR.htm . This decree 
preserved the erstwhile limits in the Mediterranean and Black Seas which applied in accordance with a 
previous law and were determined on the basis of ‘reciprocity’ 
13 Turkish Petroleum Corporation 
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which is covered by water and the rest by land. It measures 149 miles latitudinally and 62 
miles longitudinally. Its coastline amounts to 648 kilometers (CIA World Factbook). With 
respect to its demographic status and according to the last census, the Greek Cypriots form 
around 77% of the population, Turkish Cypriots14 more than 18% (CIA World Factbook) 
and other ethnic or religious groups (mainly Maronites, Latin Catholics, Armenians and the 
non-officially recognized Gypsies and others) the remaining 5%. 
 
Concerning the second factor, Cyprus possesses a central position in global politics since it 
is located at the juncture of Eurasia with Africa. Turkey is the closest neighbor at 50 miles 
north of the island, while Syria and Lebanon are approximately 70 miles to its eastern side. 
Other neighboring territories include Egypt in the south (240 miles) and Israel to the 
southeast (124 miles). In the westward direction, the nearest Greek Dodecanesian island, 
Castellorizo is 170 miles away while its distance from the Greek mainland is close to 500 
miles. The island’s main natural resources (besides hydrocarbons) are copper, pyrites, 
asbestos, gypsum, timber, salt, marble and clay earth pigment (CIA World Factbook).  
 
From antiquity to the British administration 
This place has witnessed the invasion, the establishment and the interaction of all the 
ancient civilizations of pre-history and proto-history projecting it into a “crossroad of 
civilizations”. Hellenic tribes (Arcadians, Achaeans and Mycenaeans -the latter arrived at 
the island during the middle Bronze Age, meaning 2000 BC- 1950 BC) - settled in Cyprus 
contributing to the formulation of the Hellenic character of the island. Phoenicians, 
Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Macedonians (Epigones of Alexander the Great’s legacy, 
the Ptolemaic dynasty), Romans, Eastern Romans (contributing to the Hellenic Orthodox 
character of the island’s spiritual and cultural identity), Venetians and Ottomans had also 
settled on the island in the past. Between 1571 and 1878 the Ottoman Empire ruled over 
Cyprus, playing a crucial role in the formulation of the Turkish Cypriot identity. During the 
dawn of the 19th century Greek Cypriots constituted more than 80% of the total 
population.  
 
From the beginning of the British Administration to the establishment of the 
Republic of Cyprus 
                                                 
14 Without including the Turkish settlers whose case will be briefly depicted below in this section 
 
 
Politikon: IAPSS Political Science Journal   Vol. 27 
 
26 
 
In 1878 the Ottoman rule over Cyprus came to a substantial (but not official) end. The 
Sultan Abdul Hamit II, at the culmination of the Great Eastern Crisis and under the fear of 
an eventual Russian expansion into his territories decided to assign the administration of 
the island to the British as an exchange for formal guarantees to protect the integrity of the 
Ottoman borders from any Russian expansionism. According to Article VI of the Annex 
to the secretly signed Cyprus Convention in the context of the 1878 Berlin Congress, 
England was supposed to return Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire in case Russians had 
restored their territorial possessions in the Ottoman Empire. England was exercising de 
facto and the Ottomans de jure sovereignty over Cyprus. In 1914 the British annexed the 
territory justifying their action in the outbreak of the First World War and the Ottomans’ 
decision to align their forces with the opponents of the British during that time, the Central 
Powers. In 1923 they ratified the de jure annexation of Cyprus, through the Lausanne Treaty 
that was officially terminating the Greek-Turkish war of that time. In 1925 Cyprus was 
proclaimed a Crown Colony and Greek Cypriots envisaged in this evolution the potential 
“outlet” for the realization of their aspirations for enosis, meaning the self-determination 
and unification of the island with Greece. In 1931 these aspirations boiled over with a 
spontaneous rebellion against the British rule, leaving Government House in flames 
(Anderson 2008). As a response, the British administration suspended the colony’s 
constitution and decreed any agitations related to enosis punishable. 
 
The enosis challenge to British authority got more intense in the aftermath of World War II. 
Under the aegis of Michael Mouskos-elected bishop of Kition in 1948 and archbishop 
Makarios III (since 1950)-the Church in 1949 mobilized mass popular support for enosis in 
a 'plebiscite' that was conducted in churches throughout the island in January 1950. 96% of 
the participants supported the union with Greece. On the other side, Turkish Cypriot 
separatism had never assumed any significant form till 1950s, when KATAK15, the 
Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus, established in 1943, came to 
embrace partition, taksim, as the main goal of the Turkish Cypriot nationalism in contrast 
to the Greek-Cypriot claim for enosis. Greece, under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Papagos (ex-field marshal), sought unsuccessfully to project the Cyprus question into the 
agenda of the 9th session of the General Assembly in the UN. Great Britain unveiled its 
concerns that a potential internationalization of the issue by the Greeks, without first 
                                                 
15 The initials stand for Kıbrıs Adası; Türk Azınlık Kurumu  
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informing the Turkish government, would flare up the Turkish fears that Greece was 
making a territorial claim for the island. This gave the British an ally in the UN (Turkey) on 
the one side and raised the claims for self-determination from the Turkish side on the 
other. As a result, the Turkish involvement in the Cypriot state of affairs revitalized the 
above-mentioned Turkish Cypriot nationalistic sentiments for taksim. 
 
In 1955 an outbreak of anti-British military activities under the banner of EOKA16, the 
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, took place urging the search for a self-rule 
scheme with respect to the administration and sovereignty of the island. Under this 
pressure, Great Britain initiated a Tripartite Conference in London for the island’s political 
future but no solution was reached. It remained, however, significant since it has marked 
the beginning of the active participation of Turkey in the Cyprus question (Blay 1981: 80). 
Gradually the concept of double self-determination (enosis for Greece and taksim for 
Turkey) was gaining momentum as an option for the future of the island. Turkey adopted 
this idea and established partition as the cornerstone of its Cyprus policy for almost five 
decades. Greece and Turkey, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots became the main actors 
in the dispute while Britain assumed the role of an arbiter among them. The inter-
communal relationship was mainly captured by mutual antagonism and resulted in 
occasional violent incidents. In November 1959 the Labor party initiated preliminary 
negotiations between Greece and Turkey aiming to resolve the Cyprus question. The main 
features of a settlement on this issue and agreed upon by the main actors (Greece, Turkey 
and Great Britain) rested on three pillars: the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, 
according to which the island would gain its independence, the Treaty of Guarantee, 
according to which three guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and UK) would defend la 
raison d’ etre (excluding enosis and taksim as future options) and the Treaty of Alliance 
according to which the parties would take over the obligation to resist any attack or 
aggression against the independence of the state. 
 
The birth of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1974 developments 
With the London Agreement in 1960 the Republic of Cyprus came into existence. 
Nevertheless, the multiple checks and balances, provisioned in the Treaties, inhibited the 
functional operation of the constitution. The amendments proposed by the President 
                                                 
16 The initials stand for Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston 
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Archbishop Makarios III faced the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot vetoes. This resulted in a 
constitutional deadlock situation, which led in its turn to the paralysis of the state. These 
disagreements lit the spark for widespread inter-communal violence, as a result of a quarrel 
that broke out in December of 1963 between a Greek Cypriot policeman and a Turkish 
Cypriot citizen that ended to the death of two Turkish Cypriots. British troops intervened, 
establishing the buffer zone, which is marked by a 'green line' between the opposing 
groups and then paved the way to the UN peacekeeping mission in 1964.  
 
The political developments in Greece -the establishment of the military junta in 1967 and 
the inter-communal tensions in November 1967 (with the bombing of villages and forces 
in both sides)- brought the talks to the breaking point. In May 1968 the dialogue was 
resumed again and negotiations took place for almost six years but were terminated on 15 
July 1974. A coup d’état attempt against Macharios III, supported by the then Greek 
military dictatorship, was followed by the Turkish invasion which altered the demographic 
structure of Cyprus and resulted to a massive social dislocation. Turkish forces occupied 
37% of the island, including the towns of Famagusta, Kyrenia and Morphou and an 
important proportion of the agricultural land. Approximately 3,500 people were killed 
during the coup and invasion. The location of the bodies of almost 2,000 missingpeople 
(mostly from the Greek Cypriot side) is still under investigation. 180,000 Greek-Cypriots 
were obliged to flow to the south, relinquishing their homes and properties, whereas 
approximately 65,000 Turkish-Cypriots did subsequently move north and took their place 
(Souter 1984: 660). In the aftermath, Turkey established a presence of 35,000 Turkish 
occupation troops on the island. 
 
Furthermore, the Turkish authorities, seeking to further alter the demographic status of the 
island and enhance the Turkish element in the Northern side, were continuously moving 
settlers from the Turkish mainland to the northern territories of the island17. The number 
of the settlers, thus residing in the island, is disputed while a significant number of Turkish 
Cypriots were emigrating from the island. These policies have been continuously 
condemned by the international community as violating international human rights’ 
provisions.  
 
                                                 
17 This can be confirmed by reports circulated in both the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot press 
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From 1974 until today 
In the light of these events, the Security Council immediately reacted and passed a 
resolution calling for a ceasefire, an immediate termination of the foreign military 
intervention and the withdrawal of all the forces besides those whose presence was 
authorized by the Treaties’ provisions. Amid negotiations between the primary 
stakeholders, a second wave of a Turkish invasion was launched consolidating the Turkish 
military presence on the island. The Security Council passed several resolutions calling 
Turkey to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of Cyprus 
Republic. The UN established ceasefire lines and a buffer zone between the areas 
controlled by the opposing forces. The difficulties in reaching a peaceful settlement 
became greater when on 15.11.1983 the Turkish Cypriot administration in the North 
unilaterally declared its independence and only gained recognition from the Turkish 
Republic. The condemnation by the international community was manifested in the 
Resolution 541 of the UN SC (1983) that clearly stated that the unilateral independence 
declaration had no legal grounds and should be withdrawn. Since this condemnation has 
not been echoed by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the island remains divided 
through a “green-line” between the southern part (Republic of Cyprus) on the one side –
being recognized by all members-states of the UN, except for Turkey- and the northern 
part, ruled by the Turkish Cypriots, whose entity has not been legally recognized by any 
UN member state, besides Turkey. 
 
Continuous efforts initiated by the international community to bring about a solution were 
fruitless, mainly attributed to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot intransigence to conform 
their policies to UN SC resolutions. One of the milestones of these efforts was noted in 
2004 when the UN came up with the decision to put the Annan Plan18 to referendum. 
Nevertheless, 76% of the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan while 65% of the Turkish 
Cypriots side favored the plan. In the aftermath, the negotiations conducted between the 
President of the Republic of Cyprus, Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot leaders Mehmet 
                                                 
18 The Annan Plan was conveying the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic covering the entire 
territory of the island with the exception of the British Sovereign Base Areas. It would constitute a bi-zonal 
and bi-communal federal republic with federal and constitutional laws. A national anthem and a new national 
flag were also depicted. There would be a single common state that would be formed by two component 
states-federal units (the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot) which would hold a political equality. Under 
the plan, some 8% of the land would be returned to the Greek-Cypriots, diminishing the Turkish-Cypriot 
share from 37% to 29% 
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Talat (2008-2010) and Eroglu (2010-2012) led to the drafting of common positions or joint 
declarations but no evident progress was to be noted. 
 
In February 2014, Nikos Anastasiades, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and Dervis 
Eroglu, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, signed a Joint Declaration that laid out certain 
“ground-rules” upon which the then stalled peace talks -aiming at the island’s reunification- 
could be revived. The perspective to cooperate on the exploitation of the natural gas 
reserves (analyzed below), detected off the southern side of the island was considered by 
the international community (UN, EU) as a carrot or “window of opportunity” to reach a 
settlement. However, as shown below, these reserves added extra chill to the Cypriot 
question.  
 
Conclusions: Policy paradigm as an alternative route to examine 
security discourses 
The aim of this research was to prove how the accessibility pillars, the historical and legal 
contexts, lend their perennial attributes to the securitization discourses of the leaders. By 
briefly presenting the energy discourses performed by the leaders and by analytically 
delineating the pillars upon which energy security is built, the first assumption of this paper 
is that the historical vocabulary of the Cyprus conflict has not captured the lexicon of the 
current tensions as it was expected to since the references to history were not as frequent 
as anticipated. The second assumption was that the leaders did recall provisions of 
UNCLOS to justify the validity of their securitization discourses.  
In order to assert the impact of history on these discourses, a future research should 
broaden the amount of data. This means that another project could use more statements 
evidential of portraying the links between history and securitization, as the framing of the 
current tensions. The statements of the Turkish authorities, which have played an active 
role in the actual tensions, should be also included, although in rhetorical terms, the 
“securitization” discourses do not appear that often in the radar. 
 
Besides this, an alternative theory could have been put in place in order to highlight the 
significance of history in the formulation of these discourses. By theorizing that much of 
these discourses are conducive to the formation of the leaders’ preferences, we have to cast 
light upon the driving forces that form them.  
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There is no doubt that the way in which the political leaders of nation-states view each 
other, as well as the nature of the conflict, is of fundamental importance in determining the 
discourses they resort to. According to George (1969), a political actor perceives and 
simplifies the reality through the prism of his own “cognitive map” of politics. This 
includes the belief system that has been referred to in the past and is called “operational 
code”. Following this line, Weir and Skocpol (1985) assert that the ideals, which leaders 
pursue at any moment in time, are shaped by “policy legacies” or “meaningful reactions to 
previous policies” and/or crises. Attributed to the lessons they draw from these 
experiences, they develop a “policy learning process” that deliberately attempts to “adjust 
the goals or techniques of policy in the light of past experience and new information” (Hall 
1990: 7). Hence, they establish a set of cognitive and moral maps that orient them towards 
a policy sphere. This set works as a tool identifying problems, specifying and prioritizing 
leaders’ interests and goals (Bleich 2002) and thus, making their discourses comprehensive, 
convincing and legitimate (Campbell 1998: 381).  
 
Coined by Peter Hall, we are referring to this system as the “policy paradigm”19. Paradigms 
constitute broad cognitive constraints on the range of solutions that actors perceive and 
deem serviceable for solving problems. They generally reside in their cognitive 
backgrounds as underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about the nature of the 
conflict. Their effects are profound here in the sense that they define the terrain of the 
“securitizing discourses” (Hall 1993; Lau et al 1991). For Hall, policy paradigms guide 
learning processes through which existing policy legacies are evaluated and criticized.  
 
Through the delineation of the contexts mentioned above, we could identify and document 
these historical and legal lessons that the leaders have pulled up in order to draft their line 
of argumentation in the light of the recent developments. Via the discourse analysis we 
conducted, and by broadening the amount of data, we could figure out how the “legacies 
of history” and “traumas of the past” might have come into the leaders’ phraseology while 
facing current challenges. We could find out whether and in which manner historical 
examples, deriving from the past, had been used by the leaders in order to establish their 
energy security discourses. This could, thus, illustrate the functionality that the historical 
context displays, as part of the “accessibility’ indicator. 
                                                 
19 From the latin word “paradigma”, which, in its turn from the Greek word “παράδειγμα” that means pattern 
or model. 
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